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Abstract—In this paper, we address an unsolved problem in
the real world: how to ensure the integrity of the web content in
a browser in the presence of malicious browser extensions? The
problem of exposing confidential user credentials to malicious
extensions has been widely understood, which has prompted
major banks to deploy two-factor authentication. However, the
importance of the “integrity” of the web content has received
little attention. We implement two attacks on real-world online
banking websites and show that ignoring the “integrity” of the
web content can fundamentally defeat two-factor solutions. To
address this problem, we propose a cryptographic protocol called
DOMtegrity to ensure the end-to-end integrity of the DOM
structure of a web page from delivering at a web server to
the rendering of the page in the user’s browser. DOMtegrity is
the first solution that protects DOM integrity without modifying
the browser architecture or requiring extra hardware. It works
by exploiting subtle yet important differences between browser
extensions and in-line JavaScript code. We show how DOMtegrity
prevents the earlier attacks and a whole range of man-in-
the-browser (MITB) attacks. We conduct extensive experiments
on more than 14,000 real-world extensions to evaluate the
effectiveness of DOMtegrity.
Index Terms—Web Page Integrity, Web Crypto API, Browser
Extension, WebExtension, Man in the Browser, JavaScript,
DOMtegrity
I. INTRODUCTION
Browser extensions have become the dominant method to
extend browser functionality. All major browsers (Chrome,
Firefox, Safari, Opera and Internet Explorer) support exten-
sions, and host dedicated repositories (“stores”) from which
extensions can be downloaded and installed directly from the
Internet. Mozilla reports average rates of more than 1 million
Firefox extensions downloaded daily and about 100 new
extensions created every day throughout 2017 [1].
Extensions are normally distributed and executed in con-
trolled environments. All extensions uploaded to a repository
are subject to a vetting process, which is a mixture of au-
tomated program analysis and manual code review aiming
to identify malicious extensions and prevent their spread.
Furthermore, extensions are run in a restricted (so-called
“sandboxed”) environment and only have access to a prede-
fined set of browser APIs.
However, the vetting process is not bullet-proof. A study
conducted by Google researchers found nearly 10% of ex-
tensions examined to be malicious [2]. By using obfuscation,
some malicious extensions can slip through the vetting pro-
cess. Furthermore, the extension update mechanism provides
an additional exploit path for the attacker. In 2014, two popular
and previously vetted Chrome extensions, “Add to Feedly”
and “Tweet This Page”, were sold to spammers who updated
the extensions to inject advertisements and affiliate links into
websites opened in the browser.
The Problem. The key problem with extensions is that,
once installed, they possess over-privileged capabilities that
may be abused by attackers. For example, an extension is free
to modify the Document Object Model (DOM) of a web page.
This allows a malicious extension to manipulate the display
of a web page and deceive users into believing something
false. The change of the web page content may be subtle, but
when it is combined with social engineering techniques, it can
cause significant harm to user security [3]. In Section II, we
will demonstrate two attacks on real-world banking websites
(HSBC and Barclays) to show how a malicious extension may
stealthily steal money from the user’s bank account by making
small modifications to the DOM structure of an online banking
web page.
Existing solutions to prevent malicious extensions generally
involve changing the browser’s internal design [4], [5], [6],
strengthening the vetting process of repositories [2], [7], [8],
[9], [10], asking users to install yet another (trusted) extension
that detects malicious behaviour of other extensions [11], [12]
or requiring an external hardware device (e.g., Cronto) that
performs out-of-band transaction verification.
Our solution. In this paper, we propose a cryptographic
protocol that we call DOMtegrity to ensure the integrity of the
DOM structure of a web page delivered from a web server to
the rendering of the page at the client browser in the presence
of malicious extensions. Compared to previous solutions, ours
does not require changing the browser’s existing internal
design; it does not need any external hardware device; it
is orthogonal to the strengthening of the vetting process; it
can be easily implemented by embedding in-line JavaScript
code in the web page rather than requiring the user to install
another (trusted) extension. The novelty of our solution lies in
exploiting subtle but important differences between extensions
and in-line scripts in terms of their rights to access Websockets
established between the server and the client. This is combined
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with leveraging the latest Web Crypto API that is recently
added in all major browsers.
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are
summarized below:
• We propose DOMtegrity, a cryptographic protocol to
protect end-to-end integrity of a web page’s DOM from
the point of delivery at a server to the final display in a
client’s browser. This is the first solution that works with
the standard WebExtensions architecture without needing
any external hardware.
• We present an efficient implementation of DOMtegrity,
using JavaScript on the client side and Node.js on the
server side, and demonstrate that the proposed solution
is effective and only adds a small overhead to the com-
putation load and communication bandwidth.
• As part of the evaluation, we implement two attacks on
real-world online banking systems (HSBC and Barclays)
to show how a malicious extension can compromise the
security of the user’s bank account, and how DOMtegrity
can prevent such attacks as well as a whole range
of man-in-the-browser (MITB) [13] attacks that involve
maliciously changing the DOM structure of a web page.
II. MALICIOUS EXTENSION ATTACKS ON ONLINE
BANKING
Attacks caused by malicious extensions are often known
as man-in-the-browser (MITB) attacks. To demonstrate the
importance of understanding the threats imposed by malicious
extensions in modern browsers, we show two proof-of-concept
attacks on real-world banking websites, HSBC and Barclays,
by exploiting the capability of browser extensions to modify
the DOM of a web page. The extensions are developed for
both Firefox and Chrome based on the standard WebExten-
sions framework. In the proof-of-concept demonstration of
the attacks, the money was transferred between the authors’
accounts. All the experiments were approved by Newcastle
University’s ethics committee.
A. WebExtensions Capabilities
Before describing the attacks, we should first explain We-
bExtensions1. The WebExtensions framework is a W3C stan-
dard cross-browser architecture [14] for developing browser
extensions using HTML, CSS and JavaScript. It is now sup-
ported in all major browsers except Safari.
An extension developed based on WebExtensions consists of
three components: the background page, the UI pages, and the
content scripts. The background page is in charge of long-term
operations that last beyond the lifetime of a particular browser
window and is provided with access to browser APIs. The UI
pages put together the extension user interface. Content scripts
are JavaScript programs that are run in the context of a web
page and are allowed to interact with the page.
Although the background and UI pages do not have access
to the DOM of the page, content scripts can modify the DOM.
1https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/overview
Through content scripts, an extension can hide elements of
the DOM and insert another element in the same location to
effectively replace the original element. For example, a text
box can be placed by a malicious extension in place of a
password text box to capture a user’s password.
B. Attack Model
In the rest of this paper, the attackers implement their threat
scenario through a malicious extension installed in the victim’s
browser. Thus, the capabilities of a malicious extension are
limited to the context of a browser. We assume attackers have
not installed any operating system level malicious software
on the victim’s device to extend their capabilities beyond the
browser execution context.
In the following demonstration, we assume that a malicious
extension is already installed on a client’s browser. This can
be done through disguising malicious extensions as legitimate
browser extensions, using Trojans to install such extensions,
missing plug-in attacks, or purchasing popular extensions and
then adding malicious code during updates [15], [3]. In both
attacks, the web pages that are presented to the victim are
from the genuine banking websites via HTTPS.
We assume that the attacker has an account that they wish
to move funds to, and the details of this account are either
hard-coded into the browser extension or received in real
time from a remote Command & Control (C&C) center [16].
The attacker’s bank account will eventually be exposed by
checking the victim’s bank transaction records. However, we
assume this is not any issue for the attacker since he only needs
to prevent the discovery of the fraud for some short timescale
in which the funds can be withdrawn from the account.
C. HSBC Attack
The first attack shows how a malicious extension can easily
bypass the two-factor authentication that is adopted by major
banks, including HSBC. In this attack, the extension intercepts
the victim’s authentication credentials (i.e., login details),
sends them to a remote attacker and redirects the user to a false
maintenance page. Depending on the security policy of the
banking web site, this authentication could involve a regular
password and an additional one-time password (OTP) as a
second factor which is either sent to the user’s mobile phone
as an SMS or locally generated using a dedicated device (i.e.,
a Chip Authentication Program (CAP) device) provided by the
bank.
We developed a proof-of-concept attack that targets the
HSBC online banking web pages. To authenticate their clients,
HSBC uses a password-based user authentication augmented
with an OTP generated by a dedicated device, the HSBC
Physical Secure Key. Our attack works as follows:
1) When the victim requests the login page, the browser
extension content script replaces the username and pass-
word text boxes with its own and records the victim’s
username and password by communicating with the
extension background page.
Fig. 1. The HSBC customer service page modified by the malicious extension
to contain a message indicating website technical difficulties.
2) When the victim is prompted for an OTP, the browser
extension records what the victim enters in a similar
manner.
3) The victim is then redirected to a genuine customer ser-
vice page. However, the content of the page is changed
on the fly by the extension content script to include a
message indicating that the website is temporarily un-
available for maintenance or due to technical difficulties
as shown in Figure 1.
4) The stolen login credentials are sent to the attacker who
can then log into the victim’s online banking account.
We have implemented the attack by developing extensions
for both Firefox and Chrome based on WebExtensions. Our
extensions were able to perform the attack successfully with-
out being detected by the bank server. Consequently, we were
able to impersonate the victim and log into his or her bank
account on a separate machine.
D. Barclays Attack
The second attack shows how a malicious extension can
defeat transaction-specific user authorization, which is added
by many banks such as Barclays as an extra layer of security
on top of two-factor authentication. Here, when an already
authenticated user requests a transaction, she is required to
provide a transaction-specific authorization code which is
either sent to the user out of band or generated by a dedicated
device upon unique transaction-specific input. This transaction
authentication is designed to prevent modification of transac-
tion data (e.g., recipient and amount) by man-in-the-browser
attackers.
Fig. 2. The Barclays instructions page modified by the malicious extension
to include the attacker’s account number (redacted as XXXXXXXX) as the
REF number. The modified area is represented in the green box.
Barclays uses the strongest form of transaction authen-
tication (the so-called full transaction authentication [17])
in which the unique transaction authorization code (i.e., the
transaction-specific OTP) is cryptographically bound to the
transaction data. The authorization code is calculated by
a dedicated device provided by Barclays called PINsentry.
Alternatively, the user can use the functionally equivalent
Mobile PINsentry application on her smartphone. PINsentry
is a battery-powered device consisting of a numeric keypad,
a small LCD screen, a card reader and a processor. When a
transaction is requested through Internet banking, the user is
required to manually enter the transaction details, including
the payee account number and the amount, on PINsentry (or
Mobile PINsentry) and then enter the PINsentry produced
authorization code on the internet banking web page. However,
in the following we show how a malicious extension can defeat
this security measure by combining social engineering and
DOM modifications. The attack works as follows:
1) When the victim requests a funds transfer, she is pre-
sented a form to provide the details of the funds transfer,
including the payee account number and the amount.
The malicious extension content script replaces the text
box where the victim is supposed to enter the account
number of the intended payee with its own text box and
records the entered account number by communicating
with the extension background page.
2) Then the user is presented with a dialogue confirming
the transaction details and instructing her how to get
a transaction authorization code from PINsentry. The
instructions include asking the user to “Enter the payee’s
account number as your REF:” followed by the payee’s
account number. The malicious extension content script
replaces this instruction with “Enter this REF number:”
followed by the attacker’s account number, as shown in
Step 3 of the instructions in Figure 2 with real bank
details suitably redacted.
3) A non-expert user, trusting the HTTPS page to be secure
and failing to notice the above subtle change, then enters
the attacker’s bank details in PINsentry and provides
a code authorizing the funds transfer to the attacker’s
account.
4) The browser extension changes the final confirmation
page before it is displayed to the user so that it shows
the account details of the original intended payee rather
than that of the attacker.
The key issue that we were able to exploit is that PINsentry
prompts the user for two pieces of transaction information:
“REF” and “Amount”. The only information about what
“REF” means is present on the website, which can be modified
by the extension. We have responsibly disclosed our attack to
Barclays and since then Mobile PINsentry has been updated
and the prompt on the app has been fixed to explicitly ask the
user for the payee’s account number instead of a REF number.
III. OUR PROPOSED SOLUTION: DOMTEGRITY
In this section, we propose a solution, called DOMtegrity,
to address MITB attacks such as those demonstrated in the
previous section. Our solution is designed based on the We-
bExtensions framework, which is now the standard extension
development architecture recommended by W3C and adopted
by Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Edge and
Opera.
A. WebExtensions Security Model
The WebExtensions security model as implemented in mod-
ern browsers is based on the model proposed by Reis et al. [18]
who discussed the real-world security issues experienced by
Google Chrome and advocated a systematic method to prevent
these attacks. Here we discuss parts of this model that are
necessary for the description of our protocol.
Browser Zones. In modern browsers, the execution envi-
ronment is divided into two zones: an unprivileged Internet
zone in which web pages are executed, and a privileged
Chrome zone in which extensions are executed. A schematic
representation of these zones is shown in Figure 3. Scripts in
the Internet zone (i.e., the so-called in-line scripts within the
web page) cannot have access to the data in the Chrome zone
(i.e., the extension scripts), and vice versa. Therefore, although
the web page scripts and the extension content scripts can
interact with DOM separately, they cannot interact with each
other. This concept is called the isolated worlds principle [20].
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Fig. 3. The Internet and Chrome zones of a modern browser and how web
pages, extensions, and plug-ins interact [19]
The main reason for the isolation is to prevent malicious in-
line scripts from exploiting the vulnerabilities that may exist
in extension content scripts [19]. However, as we will explain,
the isolation is also useful in defending against malicious
extensions when the in-line scripts are from a legitimate
source.
Permissions. Every extension must provide a “manifest” in
the JSON format which defines the resources and the corre-
sponding permissions for each component of the extension.
Based on this manifest, users are asked to grant the required
permissions at the time the extension is installed, and once
installed, the extension’s access to browser APIs is limited to
these permissions.
B. Design Overview
DOMtegrity is designed to enable the server to detect any
unexpected modification of the DOM by extensions when the
web page is rendered in the browser. The underlying idea is
that DOMtegrity securely records all the modifications made
to the web page DOM until the final rendering of the page and
then securely communicates the recorded modifications to the
server. The server is then in a position to decide whether or not
the client’s browser has parsed the page as the server expected.
DOMtegrity is implemented as a JavaScript program, called
pid.js, which is then embedded as an in-line script (within
a <script> tag) in the web page that the server wishes to
protect. This in-line inclusion is necessary since extensions are
not able to restrict the execution of in-line web page scripts,
whereas they can block loading external script files. For the
in-line Javascript to work, we assume that JavaScript execution
is not disabled in the browser.
Since DOMtegrity is to record all modifications to the
DOM, it is essential that pid.js is placed at the start of
the page source code and before all other HTML tags. Since
Server pid.js 
 Define MutationObserver 
 Stop Event Propagation 
 Define DOM Expando 
If Duplicate Request Received 
 Return REJECT 
Establish WebSocket 
Generate Random Key k 
 Record DOM Mutations 
 Generate Page ID: PID 
 Compute Assertion A = HMACk(PID) 
If Duplicate Request Received 
 Return REJECT 
Retrieve Expected Page ID: PID’ 
If HMACk(PID’) Does Not Match A 
 Return REJECT 
Return SUCCESS 
Open WebSocket And Request Key 
Send Key And Close WebSocket 
Send Assertion 
Initialization 
 Recording 
Verification 
Send Decision 
Fig. 4. sequence diagram for DOMtegrity
parsing the web page in browser proceeds in the order that tags
are placed in the page source code, placing pid.js at the
start of the page ensures that recording changes in the DOM
starts immediately as the browser starts parsing the page.
The isolated worlds principle guarantees that DOMtegrity’s
recording of modifications in DOM cannot be tampered with
by any extension. When executed, pid.js creates an on-
the-fly DOM property (also called a DOM expando) named
document.pid which implements the DOMtegrity func-
tions within a domain isolated from any extension.
DOMtegrity uses the recently introduced Websocket2 tech-
nology which provides a full-duplex communication channel
over TCP (or SSL/TLS for an encrypted channel) and is
now supported by all major browsers. In this paper, we
only consider Websocket established over the secure SSL/TLS
channels. The important property here is that although both
in-line scripts and extension content scripts can establish
Websockets, neither has access to Websockets established by
the other.
2https://www.w3.org/TR/Websockets
The extension’s inability to access Websocket communi-
cation established by DOMtegrity provides assurance on the
integrity of the communication between pid.js and the
server. The in-line script pid.js establishes a Websocket
with the server and this Websocket is used as a secure channel
to convey a secret key which is later used to authenticate the
DOM modifications that document.pid records. We should
emphasize that although an extension has extensive access to
HTTP(S) communications, it can only access the Websockets
that are established by the same extension.
Table I summarizes the relevant capabilities of extensions
compared with in-line scripts such as pid.js based on the
latest W3C specification (dated 23 July 2017) [14]. Both
can access the DOM and establish Websockets, but neither
can block Websocket communications. The extension cannot
access the expando created by pid.js. Neither pid.js nor
the extension can access or close Websockets established by
the other.
C. Detailed Description
DOMtegrity runs in three stages: initialization, recording
and verification. The initialization stage sets up the protocol,
the recording stage is in charge of storing all DOM modifi-
cations, and eventually in the verification stage evidence of
DOM integrity is generated on the client side and is sent to
the server for verification. These stages are described in detail
in the following. A sequence diagram of the protocol is shown
in Figure 4. We assume the web page is served over HTTPS.
The client is identified by the TLS session ID.
Stage 1: Initialization: This stage begins as the browser
starts parsing the web page. In this stage, the required setup
for DOMtegrity is carried out as follows:
Open Websocket and Request Key. First, pid.js sends a
request to open a Websocket in order to receive an HMAC key
from the server. The server caters for such a request only once
within an HTTPS session. To cater for the request, the server
establishes a Websocket channel with the client, and through
this channel sends a random 256-bit key k. The Websocket
is subsequently closed and the rest of the communication is
continued over HTTPS. Any further requests for a key in the
same HTTPS session are refused by the server. If the server
receives more than one request for the client, it is an indication
that a malicious extension tries to impersonate the client.
Define Mutation Observer. The next step is to assign a
mutation observer3 to the document class. Mutation observer
is a JavaScript global API that provides developers a way to
react to DOM modifications. It records all the changes in the
DOM tree, including the alternations in attributes. This covers
every possible DOM modification with the exception of the
changes in the way events are handled in DOM. We discuss
how to deal with this exception below.
Stop Event Propagation. In this step, pid.js stops
assignment of new events to DOM elements by calling the
3https://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/Web/API/
MutationObserver
TABLE I
CAPABILITIES OF EXTENSION AND IN-LINE SCRIPT (W3C [14]).
Capability Extension pid.js
Access the DOM 3 3
Establish Websockets 3 3
Block Websocket Establishment 7 7
Block Websocket communications 7 7
Access an expando created by pid.js 7 3
Access/close Websockets established by pid.js 7 3
Access/close Websockets established by the extension 3 7
Content Script Domain
Document
Body
p
Hello a
World!
...
pid
Initialization
Recording
Verification
inline Page Script Domain
Fig. 5. An overview of document.pid and the inability of extensions to modify
this region of DOM.
stopImmediatePropagation method4 for all elements.
Note that (in DOM Level 2 and above) existing assigned events
cannot be changed or removed unless the browser is presented
with the reference to the registered event, and the isolated
worlds principle ensures that extensions do not have access to
such references.
Define DOM Expando. Next, the script adds an ex-
pando (i.e., an on-the-fly property) to the document node
of the DOM, as shown in Figure 5. This property is called
document.pid. As a property it does not change the DOM
node structure, and hence is not visible to extension content
scripts due to the isolated worlds principle. document.pid
is implemented as an object with encapsulated functions. All
document.pid functions are private (using so-called “clo-
sures”5) except for one (i.e., document.pid.request())
which we discuss later.
Stage 2: Recording: After initialization, DOMtegrity enters
a persistent passive mode and records all DOM mutations
through the mutation observer. The recorded mutations include
adding or removing child elements to a node, inserting or
changing an attribute in a node, or modifying the data of a
4https://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/Web/API/Event/
stopImmediatePropagation
5https://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/Web/
JavaScript/Closures
DOM node. The recording continues until the user’s interac-
tion with the web page finishes and the filled form is to be
posted to the server.
Stage 3: Verification: In this stage, a page iden-
tifier (PID) containing the recorded changes in the
DOM is generated. The stage starts when the function
document.pid.request() is called. This is the only
public expando function and should be called when the client
“returns” the form, e.g., by clicking a “submit” button. This
stage uses Web Crypto API6, a relatively new JavaScript
capability to perform cryptographic operations in browser.
Generate Page ID. The first step is to generate the
PID which consists of two parts: the list of recorded
DOM mutations throughout the recording stage, and the
source code of the page at the time the verification stage
starts. According to the W3C standard, there are seven
mutations observable. Each possible DOM mutation is en-
coded into a unique digit to achieve a short representa-
tion of the list. The source code (accessible to JavaScript
via the document.documentElement.innerHTML at-
tribute) represents the final state of the DOM elements in
the page. Here we consider the protection of integrity for the
whole page, but it is possible to define a custom PID to cover
only part of the page.
Compute Assertion. Next, a message authentication code
(MAC) on the generated PID is produced in the browser using
the secret key k. We opted to use HMAC with the SHA-256
hash function as our MAC. This selection is based on two
main reasons: first, the 128 bit security of the HMAC-SHA256
is adequate for nearly all practical web applications; second,
the HMAC function is supported consistently in all modern
browsers. The computed HMAC tag is sent to the server for
verification as an assertion.
Verify Assertion. On the server side, upon receiving the
assertion, the server first checks if more than one request for
fetching the HMAC key has been received earlier within the
HTTPS session, and rejects the assertion if that is the case.
Multiple key fetching requests indicate man-in-the-browser
impersonation attacks. If only one request has been received,
the server retrieves the expected PID, computes the HMAC of
the expected PID and compares it with the received assertion.
Normally there is no need for the client to send the PID. The
server expects no changes in the DOM other than those made
by the web page scripts. Hence, the server has a specific
6www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI
expectation of the recorded DOM mutations and the final
source code of the page, and therefore a known expected PID.
The server accepts the assertion on the integrity of the page if
the HMAC verification succeeds. Depending on the decision,
the server proceeds to provide or refuse further service to the
client. In case of refusal, the server may additionally send an
error message through an out-of-band channel, e.g., an SMS
message to the user’s mobile phone.
In the protocol described above, we assume the legitimate
changes of DOM can be pre-determined, hence the server is
able to derive an expected PID. In this case, the client does
not need to send the actual modifications to the server. The
server can verify the HMAC tag against an expected PID to
decide acceptance or rejection. However, in some cases the
changes of DOM may not be fixed (e.g., they may depend on
user interactions). To address this, we only need to slightly
modify the protocol by sending PID along with the assertion
to the server. This way, the server can first verify the HMAC
tag against the received PID, and then examine the changes
recorded in the PID according to some rules to determine if
they are legitimate or not.
Choosing HMAC vs. Hash: DOMtegrity uses the Websocket
to securely transport a key which is later used in the generation
of the HMAC tag. The Websocket channel only lasts for
the duration of the key transport and is immediately closed
by the server once it sends the key. An alternative approach
would be to keep the Websocket open for the duration of the
protocol and instead of sending an HMAC of the PID, the
client can securely send a hash (say SHA-256) of the PID
through the Websocket. We chose the HMAC approach to
minimize the cost of communication since maintaining a full-
duplex Websocket requires exchanges of ping-pong messages
to keep the channel alive. By using HMAC, DOMtegrity
minimizes the duration of a Websocket only for the essential
purpose of transporting a short (32 bytes) key. As we will
show, the computation of HMAC based on WebCryptoAPI
incurs a negligible cost in the client browser. The computed
HMAC tag can be sent through an XHR request over HTTPS.
D. How DOMtegrity Prevents Attacks
In this section, we review a number of design choices in
DOMtegrity that are essential to effectively defend against
DOM manipulation attacks by malicious extensions.
Influencing the execution of pid.js. A malicious extension
may try to influence the execution of pid.js through the
content scripts or the injected scripts. First of all, it cannot
stop or change pid.js functions through its content scripts.
Due to the isolated worlds principle, and that DOMtegrity pro-
cedures are defined as document.pid expando functions,
the extension content scripts cannot block or manipulate these
procedures. Furthermore, a malicious extension cannot stop
or change pid.js functions through injection of scripts into
the page. Injected scripts do not have access to the pid.js
Websocket due to closure. The only interference that injected
scripts can cause with DOMtegrity is to call the public function
document.pid.request(). However, this will result in
the rejection of the integrity assertion since the inject script
changes DOM by adding a new <script> tag.
Polluting JavaScript variables. A malicious extension
may inject malicious scripts into the page, trying to pollute
the local and global variables used by pid.js. First, be-
cause we leverage JavaScript closure to make a protected
reference to Websocket, an injected malicious script cannot
access the local Websocket variable in pid.js. Second,
an injected script cannot prevent Websocket establishment
by DOMtegrity through redefining global JavaScript APIs (a
process known as “monkey patching”). The isolated worlds
principle prevents extensions from modifying parameters of
a page’s global environment through content scripts. Hence,
the only avenue to modify such global definitions would be
injecting scripts into the page. There are two cases here. In
the first case, the malicious extension ensures the injected
script runs before pid.js (which can be realized by setting
run_at to document_start in the manifest). However, at
document_start which refers to the time before the DOM
is created by the browser engine, there is no DOM for the
injected script to insert a <script> object, as a result there
is no influence on the parsing of pid.js. In the second case,
when the injected script runs after pid.js, DOMtegrity’s
objects have already been created based on default (clean)
variable definitions. In the implementation of pid.js, we
leverage the Object.freeze() [21] function to freeze the
DOMtegrity APIs in the initialization phase, hence making
the DOMtegrity object immutable. This prevents an injected
malicious script from performing any modifications to the
global variables used in pid.js after it is parsed.
Eavesdropping the secure channel. The pid.js Web-
socket provides a secure communication channel between
pid.js and the server. This channel is inaccessible to the
malicious extension [22]. In other words, the extension cannot
read or modify data sent through this channel.
Impersonation. The design of DOMtegrity was based on
the W3C standard on “browser extensions” [14]. A malicious
extension may try to impersonate pid.js by sending a request
to establish the Websocket first. However, according to the
W3C specification [14], an extension is not allowed to stop
pid.js from sending its own Websocket request. The setting
of document_start in the manifest of the extension can
enforce the execution of content scripts before parsing the
loading page. However, a meaningful attack would need the
user to interact with a web page that is loaded in the browser
(e.g., to fill in a form or to click a button). The inclusion of
pid.js before the web page HTML code ensures that the
user interaction can only happen after pid.js sends its own
Websocket establishment request. Hence, any attempt for an
impersonation attack by the malicious extension is detected at
the server side as a result of observing multiple Websocket
establishment requests.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we describe how we implemented a number
of proof-of-concept malicious extensions to test our solution
in several attack scenarios and provide performance measure-
ments.
On the client side, DOMtegrity is implemented as a sin-
gle JavaScript program which is integrated in-line within a
<script> tag in the beginning of a web page. On the server
side, we implemented the server using Node.js version 4.4.0.
All cryptographic operations in pid.js are programmed as
asynchronous operations using JavaScript Promise objects7.
A. Confirming DOMtegrity Effectiveness
Detecting Online Banking Attacks. To confirm that our
implementation of DOMtegrity can detect the attacks we
discussed in Section II, we implemented copies of the online
banking web pages for both systems on our local server and
embedded pid.js in-line. Then, we re-ran the attacks by the
malicious extensions we developed on Chrome and Firefox.
In both cases the server was able to successfully detect the
malicious modifications made on the web pages and block
further requests from the client.
Detecting Other Possible DOM Modifications. To con-
firm that our implementation of DOMtegrity can detect other
possible DOM modifications, we considered a comprehensive
list of changes extensions can make to DOM and developed
extensions that make such changes through content scripts.
These changes include:
1) insert a new DOM element into the tree;
2) remove a targeted DOM element from the tree;
3) hide a targeted DOM element and replace it with its own
element (possibly of an identical type) with a different
ID;
4) change the style of a targeted DOM element; and
5) embed another script file which in turn changes an
attribute of a targeted DOM element.
We developed five extensions (based on WebExtensions),
each making one of the above modifications. All these exten-
sions are tested on a simple login web page, which contains
username and password text boxes and a “Sign in” button, with
pid.js embedded in-line. We tested each of our extensions
on Chrome and Firefox. As we expected, in all the experiments
our server was able to detect the malicious DOM modifications
on the client side.
B. Performance Evaluations
On the client side, the web page is run in Firefox v50.1 and
Chrome v54 on a machine equipped with Intel Core i7 2.8 GHz
with 8 GB of RAM and Windows 7 Enterprise. The server is
set up on a machine with windows 8.1 x64 Enterprise Edition
equipped with Intel Core i5 2.3 GHz with 8 GB of RAM.
File Size. The client side JavaScript is 550 lines of code and
adds 21.6 KB in the normal mode and 6.33 KB in the minified
mode to the original web page source code. Our simple
login page, the HSBC web page and the Barclays web page
are 31.5 KB, 2.1 MB and 3.6 MB, respectively. The overhead
7https://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/Web/JavaScript/
Reference/Global_Objects/Promise
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Fig. 6. Box plots of elapsed times for PID and HMAC calculations in 100
executions in Chrome and Firefox.
of the DOMtegrity client source code is relatively small
compared to those of other popular JavaScript frameworks.
For example, the popular JQuery framework8 adds 84.6 KB to
the web page in the minified mode. The server side Node.js
implementation is 240 lines of code with a size of 4.25 KB.
Computation load. The computation load of the initializa-
tion stage is proportional to the number of elements in the
web page since the browser needs to stop event registration
for every node of the DOM. We measured the time it takes for
this step to complete for our own login page and for the com-
paratively richer HSBC and Barclays online banking pages.
For each page we ran the experiment 100 times and we report
the average here. For our login page, this step took 15.64 ms
on Firefox and 16.53 ms on Chrome to complete, resulting
in an average of 0.71 to 0.75 ms per DOM element. For the
Barclays page, the richest page, this step took 624.76 ms on
Firefox and 839.83 ms on Chrome to complete, resulting in an
average of 0.49 to 0.65 ms per DOM element. Further details
are reported in Table II.
The recording stage only stores an encoding of the DOM
change for every DOM modification and incurs a negligible
computational overhead. In our experiments, the latency for
recording each mutation is 0.005 ms.
The verification stage requires the calculation of PID and
HMAC tag. In our measurements, the average elapsed time
for computation of PID is 1.97 ms in Chrome and Opera, and
2.79 ms in Firefox, and the average elapsed time for computing
the HMAC tag is 2.63 ms in Chrome and Opera, and 2.68 ms
in Firefox. The box plots of elapsed times for 100 executions
in Firefox and Chrome are illustrated in Figure 6. All values
are rounded up to the closest 0.01 ms.
8https://jquery.com
TABLE II
AVERAGE ELAPSED TIMES FOR STOPPING EVENT PROPAGATION IN CHROME AND FIREFOX FOR OUR EXPERIMENTAL WEB PAGES
#Elements Total time (ms) Time/Element (ms)
Chrome Firefox Chrome Firefox
Simple
login page 22 16.53 15.64 0.75 0.71
Simulated
HSBC page 987 713.68 485.08 0.72 0.49
Simulated
Barclays page 1283 839.83 624.76 0.65 0.49
TABLE III
AVERAGE AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE ELAPSED TIMES ON THE
SERVER SIDE FOR 100 EXECUTIONS OF EACH STEP OF THE PROTOCOL
Step Average time (ms) STD (ms)
Key generation 0.02 0.02
PID retrieval 1.96 1.59
HMAC calculation 0.17 0.01
Decision 0.03 0.02
Computations on the server side are very efficient. The most
time consuming step on the server side is retrieving PID from
storage which takes 1.96 ms on average. It takes 0.17 ms to
compute a HMAC tag and another 0.03 ms to compare the
tag against the received. The average elapsed time for 100
executions of each step on the server side is shown in Table III.
All values are rounded up to the closest 0.01 ms.
Communication Bandwidth. DOMtegrity is designed to be
efficient in terms of required communication bandwidth. The
key and the MAC tag are only 32 bytes each, amounting to
a negligible fraction of the usual data transmission between
the client and the server. The embedded JavaScript code is
relatively compact (21.6 KB in the normal and 6.33 KB in
the minified mode), as compared to other popular JavaScript
frameworks such as JQuery (84.6 KB in the minified mode).
The establishment of the Websocket is also efficient as the
underlying technology is designed to be lightweight. By the
design of DOMtegrity, the duration of the Websocket channel
is kept to the minimum only for the essential purpose of
transporting the HMAC key.
C. Compatibility with Real-world Extensions
DOMtegrity is designed to detect all DOM changes. In
the simplest case, when the server is able to anticipate all
DOM changes, pid.js only needs to send back a short
HMAC tag, which the server can verify against the anticipated
changes. However, this may not work with existing real-world
extensions that work by modifying the DOM. Examples of
such extensions include Grammarly (a popular grammar and
spell checker) and LastPass (a popular password manager). In
this section, we investigate the compatibility of DOMtegrity
with real-world extensions.
Real-world extension set. For this experiment, we have
downloaded a large set of extensions from the Chrome Web
Store and the official Mozilla Add-on repositories. Overall,
we investigated more than 14,000 WebExtensions-based ex-
tensions in the two repositories, as follows:
• all extensions from Chrome’s Starter Kit list,
• all extensions from Chrome’s Editor Picks list,
• all extensions returned with the search keyword “block”,
• all extensions returned with the search keyword
“blocker”,
• all extensions with more than 100 active users in each
Chrome Web Store extension category, and
• all WebExtension-based add-ons in Mozilla’s top 1,000
most popular extensions (57 extensions).
We installed each extension in a mint instance of the
browser, then we requested a DOMtegrity-protected web page,
i.e., a page in which the pid.js script was embedded. When
the page was completely loaded in the browser, we recorded
the generated PID in the presence of the extension on the client
side, plus the assertion verification result on the server side.
Results. We compared the generated PID on the client side
with the expected PID on the server side for each rejected
extension in order to investigate the type of modification
they applied. The W3C specification on DOM categorizes
page mutations into three groups: attributes, characterData
and childList [23]. The attributes category includes mutations
involving modifications of attributes of existing nodes. Char-
acterData refers to mutations that change any data between
the opening and closing tags of a text node. Finally, ChildList
includes mutations that involve insertion or removal of nodes
in the DOM tree. We investigated the generated PID on the
client side and classified the rejected extensions into the above
categories. A rejection by the server may be caused by a
mixture of the mutation types. In that case, the PID records
every type of the mutations.
Overall, 15% of the extensions caused rejection of the
assertion. In other words, 15% the extensions we collected
from the web store modified the DOM. Among the 15%
rejections, 86% of them involved attribute mutations, 2%
characterData mutations, and 98% childList mutations. If we
simply record every mutation caused by the extension in
the PID, the percentage of occurrence for each of mutations
types for attribute, characterData and childList mutations was
43.9%, 0.2% and 55.9% respectively. It would be interesting
to investigate if the DOM modification made by the 15%
extensions contain any malicious intent (which we plan to
do in future research). Normally, Google quickly removes
extensions from the Chrome web store as soon as they are
reported to contain malicious code. In the latest example, a
malicious Chrome extension, called Droidclub, was removed
by Google in February 2018 (along with 88 other malicious
extensions) [24], after it had affected half a million users.
Droidclub works by injecting a malicious script, hence it
falls within the category of childList mutations. Note that our
attacks on online banking systems lie in the CharacterData
category since the extension changed the fields within a text
node.
Possible mitigations. One possible mitigation strategy to
accommodate existing extensions is to consider a more flexible
policy on DOM modifications. This will require pid.js to
send the PID to the server along with the assertion. The
PID consists of the recorded mutations and the final source
code. The server can then check the PID against a set of
policies to decide if the mutations are acceptable. Thus, further
compatibility can be gained by the client sending more data
(i.e., the PID) and the server performing slightly more complex
verification.
The above solution also works with dynamic web pages
where the DOM modifications depend on how the user inter-
acts with the web page. Such interactions cannot always be
anticipated by the server, but can still be checked by the server
against rules later once a record of the DOM modifications is
obtained.
V. FURTHER DISCUSSION
Browser Parsing Inconsistencies. During the testing of
our protocol, we observed two unexpected and undocumented
DOM changes made by the browsers in Figure 7. These
changes are caught by DOMtegrity because they modify the
source code of the web page. These modifications do not alter
the content of the page, but they change the DOM structure.
Such changes are harmless from a security perspective, but
they are unnecessary and inconsistent between browsers. We
reported these minor issues to W3C and Google, and were
advised that these appeared to be implementation bugs in
the browsers and should be fixed in future releases. This
finding shows that although DOMtegrity is designed to detect
malicious tempering of DOM, it is also useful to uncover
browser implementation bugs.
Dynamic Web Pages. A dynamic web page is one with
variable content depending on the user or her actions. This is
done by either server-side or client-side scripting, or a mixture
of both.
If only server-side scripting is used, a web page is con-
structed on the server side at the time of request and trans-
mitted to the client. No further changes to the DOM are
expected in this case. Hence, such pages can be protected using
DOMtegrity as it is designed.
If client-side scripting is used, the dynamic web page DOM
is modified in-browser based on the user’s interactions with
the page. In this case, there would be no way for the server to
predict user’s interactions with the page and hence it would be
necessary for pid.js to send the PID along with the HMAC
tag to the server so that a decision on the integrity of the page
can be made based on the server’s policies.
Private Mode. Extension availability policies in private
mode are different across browsers. Firefox permits extensions
to function in private mode. In contrast, Chrome disables
the extensions by default in its private mode (incognito). In
each case, DOMtegrity functions as normal, regardless if the
extensions are enabled in the client browser.
Enabling JavaScript. Our solution requires that JavaScript
is enabled in the user browser. Obviously it will not work if
JavaScript is disabled (e.g., manually by the user, or by setting
the CSP response header). In fact, when JavaScript is disabled
in the browser, any web page with embedded JavaScript code
will stop working. In practice, there are standard techniques
to detect if JavaScript is enabled in the browser, and deliver
JavaScript-rich content only when it is enabled. The same
techniques would apply to DOMtegrity.
Confidentiality of data. Doomtegrity is designed to protect
the integrity of the DOM structure as it is rendered in the
browser, but it cannot guarantee the confidentiality of data.
A malicious extension is able to read the content of DOM
elements as well as http(s) traffic data (and may send the stolen
credentials to an external party). This is a privileged capability
explicitly permitted by the browser, which treats a browser
extension as a “trusted” part of the browser [14]. While our
work presents a way to address the integrity problem caused by
malicious extensions, we leave it to the future work to address
the confidentiality problem, which may require fundamental
changes in the browser architectural design.
VI. RELATED WORK
This section reviews related work on countering the threats
imposed by malicious browser extensions. Existing coun-
termeasures can be categorized into four types: modifying
browsers, strengthening the vetting process, requiring another
trusted extension and using external hardware.
Modifying Browsers. Proposals in this category require
their system to be integrated natively within the browser.
Ter Louw et al. design systems for protecting code integrity
and user data [4]. The latter is a mechanism that augments
the browser to support policy-based runtime monitoring of
extension behaviour. The goal is to protect sensitive user data
from being accessed or modified by the extension. Dhawan et
al. proposed “Sabre”, an in-browser information flow monitor
to detect malicious activities of JavaScript based extensions
during runtime [5]. Sabre associates an appropriate label to
all in-memory JavaScript objects based on whether they carry
sensitive information. Then, it monitors the objects carrying
sensitive information for any insecure access. Wang et al.
proposed an extension access control framework [6], which
dynamically analyses the behaviour of extensions at runtime
and controls policies to restrict their access to resources. All
the proposals in this category require modification of browser
code base. Unfortunately none of these proposals have been
adopted by mainstream browsers so far. In fact, some of
these proposals are based on the XPCOM model for creating
<input class="action-button next"
id="buttonTest" type="button"
value="Sign in">
→ <input id="buttonTest"class="action-button next"
value="Sign in" type="button">
(a) Original source code in Firefox (b) Parsed source code in Firefox
<li>
<li>
<img src="img/Money.png">
<div>
<h3>Looking after your money</h3>
<p>Get</p>
<a href="https://...">Managing</a>
</div>
</li>
</li>
→
<li></li>
<li>
<img src="img/Money.png">
<div>
<h3>Looking after your money</h3>
<p>Get</p>
<a href="https://...">Managing</a>
</div>
</li>
(c) Original source code in Chrome (d) Parsed source code in Chrome
Fig. 7. Examples of source code modifications during parsing in browsers. Note that modifications observed in Firefox (a) do not apply to Chrome, and
modifications in Chrome (b) do not apply to Firefox.
extensions in Firefox which is due to be deprecated in favour
of WebExtensions.
Strengthening the Vetting Process. Proposals in this cat-
egory involve various techniques to improve detection rates
of malicious extensions during the vetting process. Jagpal et
al. shared their three years of experience in fighting with
malicious browser extensions in Chrome Web Store [2]. They
developed a detection system called WebEval to vet the
extensions in the market. WebEval combines both static and
dynamic analysis of the source code, as well as taking into
consideration of the reputation of the extension’s developer,
and involving human experts in manual reviews whenever nec-
essary. Their method was able to identify real-world malicious
extensions with a success rate of 96.5%.
Besides methods adopted by the industry, academic re-
searchers also propose various techniques to strengthen the
vetting process. Kashyap et al. proposed a framework to
automate the vetting process in official extension reposito-
ries [7]. They proposed a notion of add-on security signature
which provides detailed information on its data flow and API
usages. Kapravelos et al. presented Hulk as a dynamic analysis
system to detect malicious extensions [8]. They monitored the
execution and network activities of extensions to detect their
malicious intentions. The had an extensive collection of real-
world extensions from Chrome Web Store, and one of their
findings was discovering a malicious extension that affected
5.5 million users. Guha et al. proposed an IBEX framework for
authoring, analysing, verifying, and deploying secure browser
extensions [9]. They suggested a high level programming
language to develop extensions. They also proposed Datalog
to specify fine-grained access control to restrict the extension’s
access to security-specific web content. Bandhakavi et al. pre-
sented the VEX framework for highlighting potential security
vulnerabilities in browser extension [10]. They applied static
information-flow analysis to catch malicious JavaScript code
in the extension implementation.
Requiring another Trusted Extension. Proposals in this
category require users to trust one particular extension and
install it consciously. Marouf et al. proposed a run-time frame-
work called REM that monitors the access made by extensions
and provides customized permission [11]. They developed an
extension for monitoring other extension based on REM. They
monitored API calls from an extension to the browser and
enforced their policies on the extension. They notified users
about the latest activities of other extensions and allowed them
to block future such activities. Liu et al. demonstrated the same
threat in Chrome [12]. They also implemented an extension to
enforce more fine-grained privileges to extensions in Chrome.
They proposed HTML elements to use another attribute called
“sensitivity” to differentiate DOM elements and enforce the
policy that they call micro-privilege management.
Using External Hardware. Cronto9 is a commercial
hardware-based solution to address MITB attacks specifically
for online banking. It was initially developed by a spin-off
company from the University of Cambridge in 2005 and was
later acquired by VASCO Data Security International for £17m
in 2013. The product has been widely deployed by major
banks in Chile, Switzerland and Germany to secure online
banking. The Cronto solution works by using a special client
device, which shares a secret key with the sever. When the
user performs transactions during online banking, the server
sends a 2-D barcode to display on the client’s web page, which
encodes the encrypted transaction details such as the amount,
timestamp and account number. The 2-D barcode is then read
and verified by the Cronto device that has the decryption
key. Upon successful verification, Cronto generates a one-time
password (OTP), which the user can enter in the browser to
authenticate the transaction. Here, the Cronto device can be
either custom-built hardware with an embedded camera or a
smart phone.
DOMtegrity is similar to Cronto in preventing malicious
modifications on the client side against MITB attacks. How-
ever, ours is a JavaScript-based software solution and does
9https://www.vasco.com/products/two-factor-
authenticators/crontosign.html
not require an external hardware token. We note that although
the main design aim of Cronto is to ensure the integrity of
transactions, it has a secondary function as a second-factor
for authentication since the device has a shared secret key
with the server. DOMtegrity does not have this function, but
it can be used in combination with any existing two-factor
authentication scheme, e.g., the Chip Authentication Program
(CAP) currently used by HSBC and Barclays.
Other Related Work. Reis et al. proposed the idea of ensur-
ing web content integrity by JavaScript [25]. Their method was
inspired by the Linux integrity check and AEGIS [26]. The
authors developed a client-side JavaScript framework named
TripWire, which detects unexpected modifications done by
ISPs and other intermediate nodes over HTTP communication.
Once the page rendering is complete, the code requested the
page’s source code from the server through AJAX requests,
then the internal source code is compared with the server’s one
at the client side. Tripwire did not consider browser extensions
in their attack model because it considers them as “trusted”.
They discussed that their method was comparable to HTTPS
with better performance. Patil [27] proposed another method
to isolate DOM from content script. They used shadow DOM
to present an encrypted view of the page data to the content
script. They developed a proof-of-concept prototype in their
research.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present DOMtegrity, a JavaScript based
solution to provide end-to-end protection of integrity for web
content from the point of delivery at a sever to the final render-
ing in a client’s browser. Our solution works with the standard
WebExtensions framework and does not require modifying
existing architectures of web browsers, nor using any external
hardware device. As part of the evaluation, we implement
two attacks on real-world online banking websites: HBSC
and Barclays, to demonstrate how malicious extensions can
compromise the online banking security, and how DOMtegrity
can effectively prevent such attacks as well as other man-in-
the-browser attacks caused by malicious extensions. We run an
extensive study of the top 14,000 extensions to investigate the
prevalence and types of DOM changes. Our study confirms
that DOMtegrity is compatible with the vast majority of
widely-used extensions, and can be made compatible with
other extensions after small modifications. We present detailed
timing measurements to show that DOMtegrity is efficient and
adds only a relatively small overhead to the performance on
both the client and the server sides.
VIII. COMPLIANCE WITH ETHICAL STANDARDS
In this research, we have designed cyber attacks on personal
banking websites. These experiments have been performed
against the author’s bank accounts and the money was only
transferred between these accounts. All the experiments were
approved by Newcastle University’s ethics committee.
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